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Abstract
With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, the EU began
dealing forcefully with issues pertaining to monetary union, social policy, foreign policy, and constitutional
reform. Public opinion became increasingly important as national governments began formulating policies
based on decisions in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg that affected domestic policies.
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Introduction
The European Union was established in 1951 with the adoption of the European Coal and Steel Community. Many of
its early integrative policies were technical in nature and received little attention from the general public. Consequently,
a permissive consensus developed allowing the elite to pursue the ideals established by the European Union (EU)
(Eichenberg and Dalton 1993, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998). In time, integrative policies became increasingly
aggressive in their scope and influence. With the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985 and the Maastricht
Treaty in 1991, the EU began dealing forcefully with issues pertaining to monetary union, social policy, foreign policy,
and constitutional reform. Public opinion became increasingly important as national governments began formulating
policies based on decisions in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg that affected domestic policies (Gabel 1998,
Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Anderson and Reichert 1996, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).
European integration was still largely driven and advanced by the elite, but it could no longer progress without the
support of the mass public (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In Ireland, France, and Denmark, national public referenda
required the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Ultimately public protests in France and Denmark on the Maastricht
Treaty delayed and modified the institutional reform of the EU. In 1994, Norway voted in a national referendum to reject
the EU altogether despite being granted admission. In 1995 parties in Sweden campaigning specifically against
European integration recognized significant gains.
Public opinion clearly influences policymaking in the EU. Furthermore, the literature illustrates that there is measurable
cross-national variation in public support for the EU. It is necessary to understand what contributes to these differences
in order to facilitate continuing integration. This paper expands on the existing literature explaining cross-national
variances in support by examining economic rationality and political culture explanations.
Economic Rationality
 For most of its history, the EU has existed purely as an economic block. Economic rationality posits that citizens seek
to influence public policy by voting according to their economic interests regarding international economic policy
(Katzenstein 1998). A large amount of existing literature suggests that economic rationality explanations are strong
predictors of a country’s level of support for the EU. Specifically, the literature has tended to examine macro- and
micro-economic, and direct and indirect economic explanations.
Macroeconomic explanations focus on the national economic indicators of member states. Many countries joined the
EU because of the anticipated economic benefits associated with membership (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996,
Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). Where membership has paid off (i.e. member states with better economic conditions),
citizens should be most supportive of integration. GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation are strong measures of
national economic performance and should vary predictably with support for the EU (Gabel 1998, Anderson and
Kaltenthaler 1996, Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). GDP growth measures the overall living standard in a country and
should therefore be positively related to national support for the EU. Unemployment and inflation measure economic
hardship in a country and should therefore be inversely related to national support for the EU.
Microeconomic explanations focus on individual level economic indicators. These explanations posit that citizens form
attitudes on the EU that are consistent with their occupation based economic interests (Gabel 1998, Gabel and Palmer
1995, Anderson and Reichert 1996). The reallocation of goods, capital, and labor across borders affects occupations
differently because certain skills are more valuable and transferable in an international economy (Gabel 1998, Gabel
and Palmer 1995, Anderson and Reichert 1996). Existing literature focuses on the differences between skilled and
unskilled workers. Gabel (1998) argues that in international economic blocks, national comparative advantages
disappear because goods, capital, and labor move readily across boarders. Consequently, occupational groups’ support
for economic integration is dependent on how well they can compete in or benefit from an integrated market. Gabel’s
relative human capital hypothesis states that support is positively related to human capital. Thus, skilled workers should
be more supportive of the EU than unskilled workers because their levels of education and experience are more
valuable and marketable in an international economic block.
Direct economic explanations focus on a country’s percent return of  money contributed to the EU (EC-budget ratio).
EC-budget ratios vary cross-nationally because some countries contribute more to the EU than others and receive a
lower percent in return. Countries with higher EC-budget ratios should have higher levels of support for the EU
because they receive more financial benefits in return from integration (Anderson and Reichert 1996, Gabel and Palmer
1995, and Eichenberg and Dalton 1993).
Indirect economic explanations focus on a country’s trade balance with EU members (intra-EC trade level). Countries
with higher levels of intra-EC trade should have higher levels of support for the EU because they stand to benefit more
from the liberalized market resulting from integration (Anderson and Reichert 1996, Gabel and Palmer 1995, Eichenberg
and Dalton 1993).
Political Culture
The European Union is composed of many different countries, each with its own distinct historical and cultural traditions.
It is important to examine how these distinct historical and cultural traditions have influenced cross-national variances in
public support for the EU. Political culture is difficult to pinpoint and may explain why it is severely underrepresented in
the existing literature as a possible explanation for cross-national variation. The political culture explanations this paper
develops should add to our understanding of the variation in cross-national support. Specifically, the literature examines
the time and circumstances of entry, cognitive mobilization, European identification, and nationalism.
The time and circumstances surrounding the entry of member states are critical to understanding the variation in cross-
national support for the EU because each wave of entry is representative of a country’s political history and enthusiasm
for European integration (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996). Countries in the first wave of entry (Belgium, The
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Germany, and Italy) should have the highest levels of support because they were
convinced earlier that the benefits of European integration would outweigh the associated costs. Countries in the
second wave of entry (Britain, Denmark, and Ireland) should have lowest levels of support because they were initially
reluctant to commit to the idea of European integration. Only later did they realize their participation was vital to their
survival as influential European powers. Countries in the third wave of entry (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) should have
levels of support between countries in the first wave and second wave of entry. Because membership for these
countries was contingent on them establishing democratic governments and economic stability, rather than a desire to
commit to European integration, these countries should have levels of support between the countries in the first and
second wave of entry (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996).
Cognitive mobilization explanations focus on an individual’s level of political awareness and skills in political
communication that allow them to identify with international political institutions. Inglehart (1970) posited that well-
developed cognitive skills are necessary for understanding information about European integration and that cognitive
mobilization is message independent. That is, any discussion will promote support for the EU. Empirical research
indicates that these theories are inconclusive and only make sense at the individual level (Gabel 1998, Jansen 1991). I
posit that cognitive sophistication matters only in the presence of political awareness. Therefore, higher levels of
political awareness of the EU should lead to higher levels of support for that organization.
European identification explanations focus on the extent to which countries identify with the goals of the EU. A primary
concern has always been whether Europeans could successfully put aside their distinct historical and cultural traditions
(Smith 1992). Could Europeans relinquish centuries of fiercely guarded political sovereignty and move toward a
common foreign policy, a common defense policy, and a single currency? Or, would history inhibit any significant moves
toward a supranational institution? Logically, countries that are more willing to relinquish some control, and favor a
supranational institution acting in the interests of all Europeans, should be more supportive of the EU. Therefore, this
paper posits that countries with higher levels of European identification should show higher levels of support for the EU.
One measure of nationalism is the degree of pride and belief in one’s own nationality over that of another nationality.
Nationalism is measured by the degree of trust that Europeans have in the other nationalities of the EU. Despite the
world’s increasing globalization and interdependence, Europeans are witnessing a resurgence of nationalism (Smith
1992). Logically, member states that display higher levels of trust in other nationalities should have higher levels of
support for the EU. These countries should be more willing to place their trust in a supranational institution charged
with acting in the interests of all nationalities under its control and influence.
Research Design
In an attempt to explain the state of public support during the year in which the Maastricht Treaty became effective,
only those countries that were members of the EU in 1993 are included in this study. The countries included are
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. The dependent variable in this study is national support for the EU. It is derived from the following two
public opinion survey questions (Reif and Melich 1993):
 
“Generally speaking, do you think that membership in the European Community is a good thing, neither good nor bad,
or a bad thing?”
 
“In general, are you (very much/to some extent) for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?”
 
Specifically, this variable is calculated by adding the percentage of respondents that believe the EU is a good thing to
the percentage of respondents that are to some extent supportive of efforts to unify Western Europe and then finding its
average.
Independent Variables
Among the independent variables used here are those measuring economic rationality and political culture. The
macroeconomic variables in this study are measured by calculating the percent growth in GDP, the percent growth in
unemployment, and the percent growth in inflation from 1991-1992 (IMF).  The microeconomic variable is measured by
the percent of skilled workers in each country (Reif and Melich, 1993).  The direct and indirect economic variables are
measured by calculating the EC-budget ratio (OECD, 1993) and the intra-EC trade ratio (Eurostat, 1995), respectively,
in 1992.
The time and circumstances of entry variable is measured by assigning to each country a value of 3, 2, or 1 based on
their wave of entry; higher values should indicate higher levels of support. The cognitive sophistication variable is
expressed as an average, within each country, of the percentage of respondents who correctly identified the capital of
the European Commission, the percentage who correctly identified the President of the European Commission, and the
percentage who correctly identified one member of the European Parliament (Reif and Melich 1993). Similarly, the
European identification variable is expressed as an average, within each country, of the percentage of respondents who
support a common foreign policy, the percentage who support a common defense policy, and the percentage who
support a common currency (Reif and Melich 1993). The nationalism variable is measured by averaging the percentage
of respondents that have some trust in the nationalities of each country in the EU, excluding their own nationality (Reif
and Melich 1993).
Hypotheses
A rational-actor model of popular influence posits that citizens can influence public policy by voting according to their
economic interests regarding international economic policy. Economic rationality is measured by six variables.
 
H1: GDP growth is a measure of the overall living standard. Higher levels of GDP growth lead to
higher levels of EU support.
H2: Unemployment growth is a measure of economic hardship. Higher levels of unemployment
growth lead to lower levels of support.
H3: Inflation growth is a measure of economic hardship. Higher levels of inflation growth lead to
lower levels of support.
H4: Percentage of skilled workers is a measure of potential benefits from integration.  A higher
percentage of skilled workers leads to higher levels of support.
H5: EC-budget ratio is a direct measure of potential benefits from integration. Higher EC-budget
ratios lead to higher levels of support.
H6: Intra-EC trade is an indirect measure of potential benefits from integration. Higher intra-EC
trade levels lead to higher levels of support.
 
            A political culture explanation posits that nation-specific political and historical values influence cross-national
variances in support. Political culture is measured by four variables.
 
H7: The time and circumstances of entry is representative of a country’s enthusiasm for
integration. Countries in the first wave of integration have higher levels of support than
countries in the second wave of entry, and countries in the third wave of entry have
higher levels of support than countries in the second wave of entry.
H8: Political awareness is a measure of a country’s awareness of the institutions of the EU.
Higher levels of political awareness lead to higher levels of support.
H9: European identification is a measure of country’s identification with the ideals of the EU.
Higher levels of European identification lead to higher levels of support.
H10: Nationalism is a measure of trust in other nationalities of the EU. Higher levels of trust in
other nationalities lead to higher levels of support.
 
Analysis and Findings
Bivariate correlation tables were used to test the strength of the relationships between the dependent variable and each
independent variable. The findings indicate surprising behavior of many independent variables in their ability to explain
the dependent variable.
 An examination of Table 1 illustrates how support for EU varies cross-nationally. The difference between the highest
and lowest supporter is more than twenty percentage points. The remaining analyses in this section attempt to explain
why these variations exist across member states.
 
 
 
 
  
 
Explaining this cross-national variation poses a challenge. Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations between the
economic variables and support for the EU. This analysis indicates no relationships between the macroeconomic
variables and the dependent variable. None of these  correlations achieves statistical significance.
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic and Microeconomic
Correlates of Support for the EU (Pearson
coefficients)
 
GDP growth .075
Unemployment growth .194
Inflation growth .028
% skilled workers -.077
 
 There are two possible explanations for these findings. First, the earlier study suggesting that macroeconomic variables
are strong predictors of cross-national variation in support was conducted over a longer period time (Anderson and
Kaltenthaler 1996) than the study that found the same results that this paper found (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). In
other words, the effect of macroeconomic variables is seen only over time indicating, that any variation in support is the
result of the cyclical nature of the economy. Second, and perhaps more importantly, individuals may not have held the
EU responsible for national economic conditions in pre-Maastricht Treaty years. Studies conducted after adoption of the
Maastricht Treaty are needed to confirm or reject this as a possible explanation.
Table 3 indicates mixed results between support for the EU and the direct and indirect economic variables. Consistent
with the initial hypothesis, the intra-EC trade ratio is positively correlated (.551) with a statistical significance at better
than the .10 level.
 
 
Table 3: Direct and Indirect Economic Variables
(Pearson coefficients)
 
EC-budget ratio .139
Intra-EC trade ratio .551*
* p<.10  
 
 
The results produced by the EC-budget ratio are surprising. Logically, the more financial benefits a country receives as
a percentage of its contributions, the more supportive it should be of the EU. However, the data indicate that this clearly
is not the case. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) also found these results. It is possible that citizens are simply unaware of
EC budget concerns. However, as other scholars have noted, this is unlikely because the EC-budget is a constant
topic of discussion in public arenas. Rather than a lack of awareness, Eichenberg and Dalton argue that citizens form
their opinions in spite of the budget. For example, Germany is one of the strongest supporters, but it has one of the
lowest EC-budget ratios. Additionally, Denmark is one of the weakest supporters, but it has one of the highest EC-
budget ratios.
 Two countries stand out as exceptions to the indirect hypothesis. Italy has a high level of support (61.1%) but a
comparatively low intra-EC trade ratio (57.7%). Portugal has a low level of support (48.9%) but a comparatively high
intra-EC trade ratio (75%). Italy’s variance may be explained by its status as a founding member of the EU and the
relative importance of the time and circumstance of entry variable to the other variables in this research. Regarding
Portugal, the existing literature and data do not provide any obvious explanation as to why it varies with the initial
hypothesis.
 
The data indicate mixed results between the dependent variable and political culture variables. To begin, Table 4
indicates the time and circumstance of entry helps explain cross-national variation in support for the EU. Consistent
with the initial hypothesis, the time and circumstance measure positively correlates with the dependent variable (r=.556;
p<.10).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland stands our as an exception to the time and circumstance hypothesis. Ireland shows a high level of support
despite being in the second wave of entry. Accordingly, Ireland should have one of the lowest levels of support. A
possible explanation is that Ireland has a significantly higher percentage of farmers (7.3%) than the group average
(2.3%) among member states (Reif and Melich 1993). This is significant because the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP)
consumes roughly 80% of the EU’s annual budget. Because Ireland also has the highest EC-budget ratio, this suggests
that the people of Ireland are directly receiving significant financial guarantees from the EU. As a result, Ireland should
have a higher level of support despite the implications of the time and circumstance hypothesis.
 
Table 5: Cognitive sophistication, European
identification, and nationalism variables (Pearson
coefficients)
 
Political awareness .112
European identification .610**
Trust .371
** p<.05  
 
European identification, on the other hand, is positively correlated with support for the EU. One might argue that the
reason European identification is statistically significant is that these two are essentially parallel measures. However, I
posit that there is a clear and significant difference between general support for the EU and attitudes towards specific
policy proposals pertaining to the EU’s future integrative goals.  Countries may be supportive of the EU as it currently
stands but be less supportive of or even opposed to continuing integration.
Conclusions
The findings presented here illustrate a significant cross-national variation in support for the European Union.
Surprisingly, the findings indicate that macroeconomic, microeconomic, direct economic, and cognitive mobilization
explanations are poor predictors of cross-national variances in support. Consistent with the original hypotheses, the
findings suggest that indirect economic explanations, the time and circumstances of entry, and European identification
are strong predictors of cross-national variances in support. To a much lesser extent, nationalism is also an important
factor.
Common to all these significant variables, whether economic or political, is the degree to which support is linked to a
European identity. The indirect economic explanation suggests that countries are more supportive of the EU when they
depend more on European markets for their economic well being. The time and circumstances of entry suggest that
countries are more supportive of the EU when they believe more in the intrinsic value gained from working together in
mutually benefiting relationships. European identification suggests that countries are more supportive of the EU when
they believe more in the intrinsic value gained from the specific integrative policies of the EU. Nationalism, while not
statistically significant, suggests that countries are more supportive of the EU when they place more trust in other
nationalities of the EU. All of these variables attest to a sense of European identity.
To the extent support for the EU is strongly linked to a country’s European identity, more than, say, to specific
economic or political factors in a given country, then support may be unlikely to vary significantly over time. As
European integration advances, the support of each member state is going to be crucial to the EU’s success. Member
states that are less supportive of the EU will have to make a decision. Will they become active supporters or remain
passive members? Member states that are more supportive of the EU are also will have to make a decision. Will they
continue to push for further integration, or will they continue to be constrained by the delays of other member states?
Regardless, cross-national variation in support for the EU cannot be ignored at this critical time of European
integration.
 
References
 
Anderson, Christopher, and Karl Kaltenthaler. 1996. “The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward
European Integration, 1973-93.”  European Journal of International Relations 2:175-199.
Anderson, Christopher, and Shawn Reichert. 1996. “Economic Benefits and Support for
Membership in the E.U.: A Cross-National Analysis.” Journal of Public Policy 15:232-
249.
Eichenberg, Richard, and Russell Dalton. 1993. “Europeans and the European Community: The
Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.” International Organization
47:507-534.
Eurostat. 1995. National Accounts ESA Aggregates 1970-1993 Luxembourg.
Franklin, Mark, Michael Marsh, and Laura McLaren. 1994. “The European Question: Opposition
to Unification in the Wake of Maastricht.”  Journal of Common Market Studies 32:455-
472.
Gabel, Matthew. 1998. “Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalization and
Public Attitudes in the European Union.” American Journal of Political Science 42:936-
953.
____. 1998. “Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five
theories.”  The Journal of Politics 60:333-354.
____. 1995. “Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration.” 
European Journal of Political Research 27:3-19.
Hurwitz, Jon, and Mark Peffley. 1987. “How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?  A
Hierarchical Model.” American Political Science Review 82:1099-1120.
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Vol. XLLV No. 3.
Jansen, Joseph.  1991. “Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization, and Support for European
Integration.” British Journal of Political Science 21:443-468.
Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Brad Lockerbie. 1989. “Economics, Votes, Protests: Western
European Cases.” Comparative Political Studies 22:155-177.
Nugent, Neil. 1995. The Government and Politics of the European Union.  London: Macmillan
Press.
OECD. Monthly Statistics on Foreign Trade July-Dec 1993, Paris.
Reif, Karlheinz, and Anna Melich. Eurobarometer 39.0: European Community Policies and
Family Life, (ICPSR 6195) March-April 1993.
Smith, Anthony. 1992. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity.” International Affairs
68:55-76.
Urwin, Derek. 1995. The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945.
London: Longman.
 
copyright 2000
